

#27-72

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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6 JULY 1972

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**FBIS**

# **TRENDS**

**In Communist Propaganda**

**Confidential**

6 JULY 1972

(VOL. XXIII; NO. 27)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 26 JUNE - 2 JULY 1972

Moscow (2642 items)

Castro USSR Visit	(1%)	15%
Vietnam	(9%)	8%
Israeli Attacks on Lebanon	(3%)	2%
China	(2%)	2%
Nixon USSR Visit	(5%)	1%

Peking (1365 items)

Domestic Issues	(37%)	31%
[CCP 51st Anniversary	(--)	5%]
Indochina	(30%)	23%
[Sihanouk Tour	(23%)	14%]
Sri Lanka Prime Minister in PRC	(3%)	17%
PRC-Guyana Diplomatic Relations	(--)	5%
Israeli Attacks on Lebanon	(1%)	4%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

Hanoi's continuing propaganda diatribe against the U.S. air strikes in North Vietnam focuses on alleged bombing of dikes and dams, with a 1 July protest from a spokesman of the Water Conservancy Ministry as well as daily protests from the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman. A 3 July NHAN DAN Commentator article on President Nixon's 29 June press conference--in which he announced agreement to resume the Paris talks--declared that the President "shamelessly denied the bombings of dikes and dams and even refuted eyewitness reports by journalists and diplomats on the spot."

Insistence that the Vietnamese cannot be pressured into stopping their struggle or negotiating on U.S. conditions was reiterated forcefully in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article, broadcast on the 5th, which argued that the President had made another strategic mistake in resuming the air strikes. The article professed a belief that support and aid from the socialist countries "are continuous and durable," but at the same time Hanoi continues to exhibit pique over improved U.S. relations with China and the Soviet Union.

Vietnamese communist media have not directly acknowledged the counteroffensive launched by South Vietnamese forces in Quang Tri Province on 28 June; however, the fighting is reflected in routine battle reports describing alleged PLAF attacks in the province. Propaganda discussing the first three months of the communist offensive has reiterated claims of great victories, but some comment also defensively acknowledges that allied "strongpoints" have restricted these achievements.

## NHAN DAN WELCOMES AGREEMENT ON PARIS TALKS, DERIDES PRESIDENT

Hanoi reacted in a low key to the President's 29 June TV-radio press conference in which he announced that the Paris talks would be resumed on 13 July and reiterated his intention to continue the air strikes and mining of DRV ports in the absence of a response to his 8 May peace proposals. Both the DRV and PRG spokesmen in Paris released the usual statements, but no high-level statement was issued; the most authoritative comment was the 3 July NHAN DAN Commentator article--a standard, routine response to Presidential pronouncements. Apparently reaction

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was confined to this level because the President was announcing a positive move on the Paris talks which had been arrived at by mutual agreement. Foreign ministry statements as well as NHAN DAN Commentator articles had greeted the President's 24 March press conference in which he said he had personally ordered Ambassador Porter's move in suspending participation in the talks. The 4 May announcement that the United States was again suspending participation after attending sessions on 27 April and 4 May had also prompted a DRV Foreign Ministry statement as well as a Commentator article.

DRV Government statements on 11 April and 10 May had greeted the President's ordering of intensified air strikes and his 8 May TV speech announcing the decision on mining DRV ports, respectively. Hanoi has normally used the vehicle of a government statement to respond to a major U.S. pronouncement or policy decision. The President's 26 April TV speech in which he condemned the communist offensive and announced 20,000 more U.S. ground troops would be withdrawn by 1 July prompted foreign ministry statements from both the PRG and DRV. (The last three previous troop withdrawal announcements--on 13 January 1972, 12 November 1971, and 7 April 1971--had not prompted foreign ministry statements, although such official statements had been issued on troop-withdrawal announcements in 1969 and 1970.)

NHAN DAN's Commentator echoed the DRV Paris spokesman in saying that the United States had to agree to the resumption of the Paris talks because of the repeated demands of the communist delegations and the pressure of world public opinion. Commentator castigated the President for "daring" to portray the resumption of the Paris talks as a token of U.S. good will. He complained further that the President sought to create the impression that the resumption was due "to active U.S. efforts" and "skillful global diplomatic activities," and that as a result the United States would be able to force the Vietnamese side to hold constructive and serious negotiations. Consistent with Hanoi's persistent avoidance of any explicit mention of the Peking and Moscow trips, Commentator thus glossed over the President's reference to the fact that the Moscow visit had taken place despite his 8 May decision on mining DRV ports. The article, of course, ignored the President's observation that it would not be useful to reveal the discussions that were held in various places on the matter of returning to the Paris peace table and that it would suffice to say that both sides considered it in

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their interests to return. It also ignored the exchange in which the President disagreed with a reporter's contention that U.S. bombing of North Vietnam was not likely to help negotiations.\*

The Commentator article seemed to hold out little hope for progress at the resumed negotiations, however. It declared that the President's assertions on maintaining a residual force as a bargaining position for the return of POW's and his opposition to a coalition government meant a refusal to withdraw U.S. troops and a continued maintenance of the Thieu regime. It went on to say that the President continued to use "the ultimatum-type arguments of his 8 May speech--that he will end bombing, shelling, mining and blockading the DRV only when the adversary releases all U.S. POW's and approves a cease-fire throughout Indochina." Commentator said that the Nixon Administration "on the one hand will use the Paris conference to soothe and deceive public opinion and, on the other hand, will continue to escalate the war."

Commentator remarked that while the President had usually used this type of press conference to announce troop reductions, he did not do so in this case because he knew that the announced withdrawal of 10,000 more troops in the next two months would provide grist for newsmen regarding the doubling of the forces in the 7th Fleet and at U.S. bases in Southeast Asia.

#### DRV SAYS VIETNAMESE WILL NOT BE PRESSURED BY U.S. BOMBING

Current Hanoi propaganda has continued to express concern over the possibility of widespread flooding during the rainy season in North Vietnam and insists that the United States is regularly bombing dams and dikes. At the same time, Hanoi has reiterated its determination to persist in the struggle regardless of sacrifices and has claimed new victories against

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\* During earlier years of the Nixon Administration, the DRV had regularly boycotted sessions at Paris following periodic, heavy U.S. air strikes--in November and May 1970 and March and September 1971. See the TRENDS of 22 September 1971. The pattern was different in December 1971 and during the air strikes last February when the allied side announced suspension of participation in the talks until the communists assumed a constructive attitude.

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the United States. As of 5 July, it said that a total of 3,725 U.S. planes had been shot down. And to bolster statements that "many" pilots have been captured, Hanoi at a 29 June press conference identified 16 pilots said to have been captured since April.

Hanoi's resolve to continue fighting was reiterated in strong terms in comment reviewing the past three months of intensified air strikes, with a NHAN DAN editorial on 1 July saying that "while the enemy can cause a number of difficulties for us, he can in no way prevent our people from carrying on their struggle." A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article, broadcast by Hanoi radio on the 5th, set out to demonstrate that the President has made another "serious strategic mistake" in resuming the air strikes against the North. It argued that he cannot succeed in his attempts to destroy the economic and defense potential of the North, to prevent the North from aiding the South, to "blunt" the communists' fighting and force them to negotiate, and to prevent the socialist countries from aiding the Vietnamese.

In discussing the mining of DRV ports, the army paper said that the Nixon Administration should review the results of U.S. efforts to block the flow of supplies during President Johnson's tenure. And it said that Kissinger in reviewing Johnson's failures "had written in a secret document" that even if Haiphong and other ports are effectively blockaded, the DRV "still has 12 coastal points through which goods can be transported by sea . . . ." The article went on to say that "the Nixon clique's use of air power to strike industrial and agricultural installations in North Vietnam did cause some temporary difficulties . . . but it has failed to have any decisive effect on the development of the anti-U.S. resistance."

#### RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST ALLIES

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN analysis of U.S. strategic mistakes contained a passage which noted "the durable and continuous" nature of aid from socialist countries but which also seemed to have polemical overtones. The article repeated the frequently voiced line that the Vietnamese revolution contributes to the protection of the socialist camp and went on to say bluntly that

by supporting and aiding our people militarily and economically, socialist countries are fulfilling their sacred international obligations while at the same time meeting the

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requirement of their international position and national interests. Their support and aid are continuous and durable. Our party's independence, sovereignty and international solidarity line is very correct and brings about fine results.

A 21 May Commentator article in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, obviously prompted by the President's Moscow visit at that time, had accused him of "sowing disunity and sabotaging the socialist camp." And it had gone on to lecture the DRV's great allies on the proper way to deal with the United States, saying, among other things, that "communists always consider the revolution of each nation as an inseparable part of the world revolution." It added that the Vietnamese are determined to defeat U.S. military escalation, "thus making worthy contributions to the defense of the socialist camp . . . ." And in language reminiscent of the above passage in the current article it said that the Vietnamese "clearly realize" the close relations between the Vietnamese revolution and the world revolution and between national interests and international interests.

Hanoi's disquiet regarding its great allies seems also to have been reflected in its recent failure to mention socialist aid and support in connection with the air strikes. Thus, on 4 July a DRV Foreign Ministry statement protesting strikes against Hanoi that day failed to make any reference to the socialist countries. This followed the pattern of a foreign ministry statement on 26 June, but it differed from other high-level statements since the escalation in this regard. The statements thus omitted the usual appeal to the socialist countries to stay the hands of the aggressors and the usual expression of thanks for socialist aid. The statement on the 4th merely called the United States' "extremely gross encroachments" against the DRV "an insolent challenge to public opinion in the world and the United States"--language similar to that used in the statement of the 26th.\*

**ALLEGED STRIKES AT DIKE SYSTEM**      The current stress on alleged bombing of dams and dikes was highlighted by a 1 July DRV Water Conservancy Ministry spokesman statement which detailed alleged U.S. air strikes against DRV dams and dikes from 10 April to 29 June. This is the third statement from that

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\* See the 28 June TRENDS, pages 1-2.

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ministry since the intensification of air strikes in early April.\* Claiming that U.S. strikes against dikes and water conservancy projects were recently accelerated, the statement declared that "especially in June, the U.S. imperialists violently struck 20 times at sections of dikes and water conservancy projects that had already been repeatedly hit in April and May." The statement also accused the United States of using "CBU bombs and smart bombs" to strike at dike repair sites. Pointing to a "typical case" on 10 June, the statement declared that on that day "U.S. aircraft made 55 sorties to strike for the second time the Thac Ba dam in an attempt to create flash floods in a number of delta areas because this Red River network was built to prevent flash floods."

The protest also highlighted attacks on 18 June which allegedly destroyed some 1,000 meters of dikes and severely damaged more than 300 meters of dikes of the Ninh Chau dike section of the Red River network in Nam Ha Province. It warned that "if the water rises, this section of dike will collapse and scores of thousands of hectares of rice paddies in the Nghia Hung and Nam Ninh districts will be flooded and the lives and property of hundreds of thousands of people in the area will be threatened." The statement went on to claim that the Kim Ban dike section in Nam Ha Province was hit on 2, 12, and 21 June and added that "if this section of dike collapses, scores of thousands of hectares of land will be flooded and the lives and property of almost one million people will be threatened." Describing the attacks against dikes as "deliberate and well-prepared," the statement said that the Nixon Administration must be held fully responsible for the consequences of these acts if flooding occurs.

Additional details on the status of DRV dikes were revealed in a 30 June press conference held jointly by the Ministry of Water Conservancy and the Commission for Investigation of War Crimes in Vietnam. Phan My, vice minister of water conservancy who presided over the gathering, was quoted by VNA as claiming that in the three months ending 29 June, "all the dikes have been attacked" along the two big rivers of North Vietnam--the Red and the Thai Binh--and along the Ma River in Thanh Hoa Province, the Ca River in Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces, and the Gianh River

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\* The first statement, dated 26 May and released on 30 May, is discussed in the 1 June TRENDS, pages 22-25. For a discussion of the second statement, dated 16 June, see the 21 June TRENDS, pages 12-16.

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in Quang Binh Province. Phan My specifically denounced an 18 June attack on the Minh Chau dike aimed at "weakening it and causing it to collapse in the period of great swelling to inundate a vast populous region south of Nam Ha Province which, in 1971, thanks to its strong dikes, was not flooded."

Recent U.S. denials that air strikes are aimed at dikes and dams within the DRV drew a 30 June NHAN DAN article by Phan Anh, president of the Vietnam Lawyers Association, which charged that the Nixon Administration will not admit that it is striking at DRV dikes "because their crime is so great" and "international law would give the death sentence as the penalty for such a crime." The article argued that the United States had attacked water conservancy projects "systematically, aiming at vital portions of the dikes to weaken the whole system to make it collapse at the time of the swellings."

**DIKE REPAIR,  
EVACUATION**

Efforts to step up the mobilization of Hanoi's manpower to protect dikes and dams were reflected in a 21 June HANOI MOI article which reported that the Hanoi party committee has launched a campaign from now until 15 July "with a view to strengthening important portions of dikes." The article indicated that all party branches are to regard this campaign as a "principal and unusual task" which must be fulfilled on schedule in accordance with both qualitative and quantitative norms. It explained that manpower necessary for this campaign is to be drawn from office workers, students, construction workers, teachers, and peasants, and that each unit is to be divided into teams and is to try to bring along such equipment as hoes, shovels, and carts.

The need to intensify the evacuation of "municipalities, cities and towns, and key places in which the enemy may strike" was stressed in an editorial in HANOI MOI on the 27th. The editorial said that in order to restrict damages from U.S. strikes, all old people, children, and all people who are not directly engaged in production and combat, and who, for one reason or another, have not yet evacuated, or have temporarily returned to the cities, should clearly realize the situation and get out of the cities. It added that party organs are to consider evacuation work "a patriotic and anti-U.S. task" and "should step up measures to help and create favorable conditions for evacuated families of cadres, workers, and cooperative members to stabilize their lives for a long time." Model factories

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and cooperatives were lauded for "properly carrying out the evacuation task by organizing kindergartens . . . collective restaurants, shelters, and tunnels."

Hanoi insists that it will not be intimidated by attacks on civilians. For example, VNA on 29 June carried an interview with Hanoi mayor Tran Duy Hung who denounced U.S. strikes on the capital on 26 and 27 June, which allegedly killed "hundreds of civilians, mostly the elderly, women, and children," but declared that "the population of this capital city is not in the least shaken, we are not frightened." Hung stated that civil defense is being stepped up, and that all economic and cultural activities have been reoriented to suit wartime conditions. He pointed to the claimed downing of the 3,700th U.S. plane on 27 June as evidence of the ability of the armed forces defending the capital to "strike stinging counterblows at the U.S. imperialists."

**CAPTURED** Sixteen U.S. pilots captured in April, May, and  
**PILOTS** June were identified at a 29 June press conference presided over by Ngo Dien, head of the press and information department of the DRV Foreign Ministry.\* Reports of the press conference underscored Hanoi's determination to intensify vigilance against U.S. strikes and pointed to the presence of the captured pilots as "convincing proof of the defeats sustained by the Nixon Administration in North Vietnam in the past three months." Two of the 16 captured pilots, Richard Logan Francis and William Hansen Talley, were said to be too ill to attend. But the other 14 "American air pirates" were put on display and identified as: David Brian Grant, Charles Allen Jackson, William David Beekman, David Burgoyne Dingee, John Paul Cerak, William Raymond Bean, Albert (Ric) Molinare, Aubrey Allen Nichols, Edward Knight Elias, Stephen Anthony Rudloff, Carroll Robert Beeler, James Phillip Padgett, Joseph Eugene Kernan, and William Glen Byrns. They conveyed messages to their

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\* The only previous identification of a U.S. pilot captured since the escalation of the air strikes was at a 17 April Hanoi press conference at which Albert Gale Despiegler was presented. Another press conference was held on 12 May, but pilots present on that occasion were men captured in February or earlier. Hanoi press conferences at which pilots were identified were also held on 19 February this year and on 20 and 30 December 1971.

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families and "voiced their deep gratitude" to the government and people who, they said, have treated them well. Yet another downed U.S. pilot, Norman Gaddis, was identified in a 4 July VNA review of recent "exploits" of a people's air force unit.

In his remarks at the press conference, Ngo Dien routinely claimed that by its alleged attacks on the dike systems the United States wants to cause big floods during the rainy season "to jeopardize the lives and property of millions of people." In describing the extensive nature of the strikes, he said that they were being carried out from the Vinh Linh area to the Vietnam-China border.

FOREIGN MINISTRY  
SPOKESMAN STATEMENTS

In addition to the 1 July Water Conservancy Ministry spokesman protest decrying strikes against dikes and irrigation projects, all but one of the continuing, virtually daily, foreign ministry spokesman statements during the past week have focused on alleged attacks on water conservancy projects.

+ The statement on the 29th protested U.S. strikes on the previous day against "many populous areas" in Quang Ninh, including the Bai Chay summer resort, and in Ha Bac, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh area. It was also charged that B-52's had bombed Huong Lap village in the Vinh Linh area and that warships had "indiscriminate'y" bombarded a number of coastal areas in Quang Binh Province. The statement specifically noted that one section of the La River dike in Nghe An Province and the Cam Ly dam in Quang Binh Province had been hit.

+ Condemning the United States for "barbarously striking at many populated ares" on 29 and 30 June, the statement on the 30th charged that B-52's had bombed several areas in Quang Binh Province and that U.S. warships had "wantonly shelled" a number of coastal villages. U.S. bombs and shells reportedly fell on Lang Son, Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Nam Ha, and Ninh Binh provinces. The protest claimed that the Nam Dan dam in Nghe An Province had been "heavily damaged."

+ Air strikes on 1 July were denounced in the protest on 2 July which charged that "continued savage attacks" had been launched against Quang Ninh, Nam Ha, Thai Binh, and Thanh Hoa provinces. It noted that "a number of dike sections" in Nam Ha and Thai

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Binh provinces had been damaged. "This is added proof," the statement asserted, "of the U.S. imperialists' continuation of attacks on the dikes and dams of the DRV."

+ Decrying the alleged "dropping of hundreds of mines to blockade Haiphong harbor" on the 2d, the 3 July statement denounced the United States for striking "at the outskirts of Haiphong and many populous areas in Quang Ninh, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh" as well as for B-52 attacks on Quang Binh Province and the Vinh Linh area on the 2d. The statement claimed that the strikes had killed or wounded "many civilians" and destroyed economic and cultural establishments and argued that "these criminal acts of war by the Nixon Administration . . . fully bare their deceitful allegations about peace and good will."

+ A statement dated 6 July said that on 5 July U.S. aircraft had "barbarously bombed" Nam Dinh city, the outskirts of Haiphong harbor, and "many populated areas" of Lang Son, Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Ha Tay, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nhe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces. Claiming that a section of dikes in Nghe An Province and the Quang Trung canal in Hai Hau district, Nam Ha Province have been hit, the protest charged the Nixon Administration with "continuing to attack populated areas as well as the dikes, sluice systems, and the water conservancy network of the DRV."

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**DRV, FRONT LAUD ALLEGED OFFENSIVE VICTORIES, NOTE PROBLEMS**

Commentaries on the past three months of fighting reaffirm Vietnamese communist claims of victories and determination to continue their struggle; however, propaganda also acknowledges the difficulties faced. A series of QUAN DOI NHAN DAN articles beginning on 29 June, a NHAN DAN editorial on the 30th, and Front radio commentaries document claims of military successes with new statistics on the fighting since the start of the communist offensive at the end of March. In this three-month period, the liberation forces allegedly killed or captured 150,000 allied troops, half of them regular troops. Of this total, 60,000 are said to have been put out of action since the beginning of May.\* In addition, the communists claim to have destroyed more than 3,000 military vehicles, 500 artillery pieces, and more than 600 aircraft during the three months. Underlining the gravity of the alleged allied troop losses, the NHAN DAN editorial maintained that they were eight times greater than those sustained during Lam Son 719 last year and four times greater than in all the major allied operations in the spring of 1971. Both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN argue that there is no possibility of the Saigon army recovering.

The NHAN DAN editorial, in stressing the magnitude of alleged communist achievements, also reflected their problems with the interjection that "it is not easy to fight an enemy who has the strong firepower of aircraft, warships, and artillery and who holds strong fortifications." It added that "our compatriots and combatants" have also "had to overcome countless difficulties and hardships" in countering the "extremely savage" pacification program. The editorial and the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN series both defensively rejected "optimistic arguments" by the allies about the military situation; and the army paper specifically derided the Administration for allegedly trying to conceal its mistakes in the war by "creating the story that the communists gambled and made a mistake."

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\* This figure is consistent with communist claims in the first week of May that in one month the allies had lost 90,000 troops. See 10 May TRENDS, page 20.

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The communists' loss of territory since the peak of their offensive was indirectly acknowledged in the article in the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN series published on 30 June which stated that liberation main forces have driven back Saigon forces and stood firm in "nearly all important strategic areas of activity." The next article in the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN series, not published till 3 July, went further than other comment in frankly citing such "temporary strongpoints" of the allies as "the great military potential" which allows the United States to "rapidly" make up for materiel losses, the "unprecedentedly large air and naval force" being used in coordination with the Saigon army, and the continuing allied control of "a number of important strategic and populated areas." This sobering list of allied strengths was offered in response to the rhetorical question of why the allies have not rapidly collapsed in view of their "many fundamental shortcomings"--a question which is probably being raised by discouraged communist soldiers in view of Saigon successes on the battlefield in recent weeks.

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN articles, and other propaganda, suggest that the situation is favorable to continue to press the offensive in the South but also indicate that the struggle will be a lengthy one. Thus the 3 July article in the army paper explained that allied strongpoints can "delay" their defeat and claimed that "a definite period of time" is needed to bring about the even development of the offensive and uprising in local areas. The 30 June QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article had similarly suggested the struggle would be prolonged, but also seemed to indicate that main-force units should continue to play a major role. It underlined the "strategic significance" of having achieved a situation in which the revolutionary forces have "strong main-force units capable of fighting continuously for a long period and enjoying a favorable terrain and posture." In this same vein, a 2 July Liberation Radio commentary held that "our regular forces can not only launch big annihilating attacks but also can fight protractedly."

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**MOSCOW STRESSES SUPPORT FOR VIETNAM, CONDEMNS U.S. BOMBING**

Moscow continues to stress the constancy of its support for the Vietnamese and routine comment has repeatedly denounced the U.S. air strikes in the North. Moscow has continued its reportage of military actions in the North and South as well as the continuing DRV protests, including the 1 July DRV statement reviewing alleged U.S. strikes at dikes over the past three months. A dispatch in PRAVDA on 2 July from its Hanoi correspondent described alleged U.S. destruction of dikes and other commentators cited eyewitness reports of such attacks. Like routine comment last week, current comment, including a 30 June PRAVDA article, has continued to score U.S. bombings of civilian targets and to accuse the United States of practicing "genocide." Commentators asserted that the U.S. attacks are "deliberate" and aimed at ruining the DRV's economic potential and at "wiping out" its population.

**SOVIET-CUBAN COMMUNIQUE** The Soviet-Cuban joint communique on Castro's visit repeated the relatively forceful language on support to Vietnam voiced by Brezhnev in his 27 June speech at a banquet for Castro.\* The two sides condemned U.S. measures to "blockade the DRV's ports and bomb installations which are important to the national economy--including dikes and dams, roads, and population centers." Moscow's first description of the U.S. mining as a "blockade" had been voiced by Brezhnev on the 27th.

The communique went on to demand "a halt to the bombings against the DRV, the complete and undelayed withdrawal of all U.S. troops and their allies in South Vietnam, the discontinuance of U.S. support for the puppet Thieu regime, the resumption of the Paris talks, and attainment--without any foreign interference--of a just political solution based on the announced proposals of the PRG, the DRV, the FUNK, and the NLHS." The demand for the end to U.S. support of Thieu has not appeared in recent official Moscow statements and may have been included at Castro's behest.

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\* Brezhnev's remarks are compared to earlier, milder Soviet comment in the 28 June TRENDS, page 7.

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The communique expressed the certainty that the Indochinese people will be victorious through their courage, determination, and heroism, and "with the political, moral and material support of the countries of the socialist community," but did not pledge Soviet aid until "total victory" as Brezhnev had done on the 27th.

At a 3 July reception for Castro, Kosygin again defended the Soviet detente policy as consistent with support for Vietnam. Pointing out that Soviet "international solidarity" is expressed in "support" for the Vietnamese people and the patriots of Laos and Cambodia who are "repulsing American aggression," he expressed confidence that they will secure "full triumph of their just cause." Kosygin went on to say that the Soviet Union's policy of peaceful coexistence with countries having a different social system does not signify a rejection of the right of peoples to oppose aggression or press for liberation, asserting that the USSR "invariably helps" these peoples.

PRESIDENT'S PRESS  
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The usual TASS report of the President's 29 June press conference noted that the President announced that the United States would return to the Paris talks on 13 July prepared to negotiate without any preconditions. Podgornyy, in a 6 July speech at a banquet for the visiting Syrian president, noted the forthcoming resumption of the Paris talks and observed, according to TASS' summary, that "it is important that at these talks a concrete and constructive discussion of the Vietnam problem be started." The TASS account of the President's press conference, unlike Hanoi's, cited him as saying that both sides consider it in their interests to return to the Paris talks and that the United States would not have returned unless it thought there was a chance for more constructive discussions. The report also observed that despite assurances that he set no preconditions for the talks, the President said that the United States would end the bombing raids only if his "three conditions" of 8 May were fulfilled. However, TASS ignored the President's review of the U.S. peace proposals and his remarks on POW's. It also omitted his flat rejection of the notion of negotiations on a coalition government in Saigon, instead, complaining routinely that the President ignored the PRG proposals. TASS noted that the President said the United States would continue the bombing and mining, as well as the exchange in which the President called "inaccurate" eyewitness reports of U.S. bombings of DRV dikes.

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There has been no followup Moscow comment on the press conference, but on 30 June TASS briefly reported that the spokesman of the DRV Paris delegation scored the President's intention to continue Vietnamization, support the Thieu regime, and reject the DRV and PRG proposals on the formation of a coalition government.

#### PEKING SUSTAINS LOW-KEY TREATMENT OF VIETNAM DEVELOPMENTS

Peking has continued its restrained approach to Vietnam developments, originating little comment and reporting foreign comment selectively. In replaying Vietnamese communist comment, Peking follows its established pattern of excising sharply critical references to the President.

Consistent with the normal time lag, Peking's first report of the President's press conference on the 29th came in an NCNA dispatch on 6 July. Observing that in the face of worldwide demands the United States has agreed to resume the Paris talks on 13 July, NCNA said the President's press conference remarks nevertheless showed that the United States will persist in its unjustifiable stand on the Vietnam question. It was particularly critical of his remarks on a coalition government.

NCNA was also notably sharp in accusing the President of voicing threats. The dispatch noted the President's expressed intentions to continue the bombing and mining of the North and to maintain a residual force in the South. It took particularly strong issue with his statement that the only way the United States would get its prisoners back would be through "doing something" to the Vietnamese. It was in this context that Chinese backing for the Vietnamese was pledged. NCNA said that such a threat can only arouse the Vietnamese people to fight to the bitter end and "arouse the Chinese people and the people of the world to have greater sympathy for the Vietnamese and support them to the end."

Other propaganda, however, has continued to mute expressions of PRC support. For example, Peking has made no reference to remarks attributed by VNA to MAC Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying--at the ceremonies for signing of the 1972 Sino-Vietnamese supplementary aid agreement--that called attention to China's "unswerving stand" of support and assistance for the Vietnamese resistance.\*

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\* For a discussion of the aid agreement see the TRENDS of 28 June, page 11.

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## K O R E A

## NORTH-SOUTH TALKS PRODUCE AGREEMENT TO PROMOTE REUNIFICATION

The "joint statement" released simultaneously in Pyongyang and Seoul media on 4 July, announcing that high-level talks in the two capitals had produced agreement on a number of steps to promote peaceful reunification, climaxed a thaw which began nearly a year ago with Pyongyang's adoption of a more flexible attitude toward the South--apparently calculated to adapt to the changing power relationships in Asia flowing from the Sino-U.S. rapprochement. The statement recorded the two sides' agreement to refrain from the use of force against each other and on measures to promote social and economic exchanges, but it was vague and generalized on the primary question of political reunification.

According to the announcement, Yi Hu-rak, the director of the South Korean CIA, visited Pyongyang from 2 to 5 May for talks with Kim Yong-chu, director of the Organizational Guidance Department of the KWP (and Kim Il-song's brother); he also met twice with Kim Il-song. Second Vice Premier Pak Song-chol visited Seoul from 29 May to 1 June for talks with Yi Hu-rak, also meeting with President Pak Chong-hui. The resultant agreement provided that reunification should be on "three principles": it should be achieved independently, should be reached by peaceful means "without recourse to the use of arms against the other side," and should transcend differences of ideology and system. Subsequent Pyongyang propaganda, calling the agreement a "brilliant victory" for the North Korean party and government, said that Kim Il-song had laid down the three principles to Yi Hu-rak and that the South Korean side had accepted them. A 5 July NODONG SINMUN editorial on the announcement as well as other propaganda, including a statement by the chairman of the North Korean Democratic Party, stressed that the agreement was a fruition of Kim Il-song's line on unification. The editorial expressed gratification that the "South Korean authorities" finally "accepted our proposals," thereby opening the way to North-South contacts and negotiations.

Underscoring Pyongyang's overriding interest in political reunification, the propaganda has pervasively termed "Kim Il-song's three principles" the most important part of the joint announcement. In that context it has expressed satisfaction over the two sides' agreement to refrain from "slander" and "defamation" of each other; to bring about

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various exchanges; to cooperate for the success of the continuing Red Cross talks; to install a direct Pyongyang-Seoul telephone link "to prevent unforeseen military incidents" and deal with other questions; and to establish a North-South coordinating committee. The composition and duties of the coordinating committee, which would presumably be the body to deal with the political questions, were not spelled out in the statement, and Pak Song-chol, in a press conference publicizing the document, indicated that the details would have to be worked out in future contacts and negotiations.

The question of the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea, unmentioned in the communique, was raised briefly in followup Pyongyang comment. In his press conference, for example, Pak Song-chol said that outside forces no longer have any excuse for interfering in Korea's internal affairs. Now that there is no threat of aggression from the North, he said, the "U.S. imperialists" must withdraw their "forces of aggression" from the South and the "Japanese militarists" should desist from their scheme to "reinvade" South Korea and keep the country divided.

A statement praising the agreement by the chairman of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (GAKRJ) once again called for a joint meeting of his organization and its South Korean counterpart on the question of independent, peaceful reunification. The GAKRJ had made similar proposals last summer, at the time of the beginning of North-South contacts and the opening of the Red Cross talks, but had received no reply from the South Korean group.

**BACKGROUND** The joint statement culminated developments over the past year in which Pyongyang had adopted a posture of moderation and flexibility toward the South, proposing a variety of measures to reduce tensions. An "eight-point program for peaceful unification" had been adopted at a session of the Supreme People's Assembly in April 1971. While containing nothing substantively new, the program put the North Korean stand on record in a package, evidently to set the stage for future moves. On 29 July the North Korean representative at the Military Armistice Commission put forward a seven-point demand for a U.S. withdrawal from South Korea which included a call upon the United States to stop preventing North and South Koreans from travelling across the military demarcation line. And on 6 August Kim Il-song announced his readiness to contact all political parties in the South, including the ruling Democratic Republican Party.

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Contacts between the Red Cross organizations of North and South Korea to discuss the reuniting of families separated by the Korean War were agreed to on 14 August. After some 20 "preliminary" sessions and a number of "working-level" meetings, an agenda for "full-dress" Red Cross talks was adopted on 16 June. The "full-dress" talks have yet to begin.

Kim Il-song has aired a number of proposals in a series of interviews with foreign reporters since last fall, most of them not carried in Pyongyang media. Among other things, he has suggested that Pyongyang might be willing to abrogate its treaties with Moscow to facilitate Korean unification; has proposed a North-South peace agreement which could precede a U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea; and has indicated that Pyongyang might be prepared to moderate its stand toward the United Nations and its relations with the United States and Japan. In his most recent interview, on 21 June with Selig Harrison of the Washington POST--unmentioned in North Korean media--he professed willingness to meet with ROK President Pak for summit talks, proposed a demilitarization of the buffer zone, and suggested a reduction of the armed forces of North and South in stages, some of which could precede a U.S. troop withdrawal.

The deescalation of anti-ROK rhetoric in Pyongyang propaganda was particularly evident in the treatment of the 25 June Korean War anniversary, traditionally an occasion for vituperative attacks on the United States and its South Korean "puppet." The anniversary was marked at a lower level than usual this year, and the content of the propaganda was bland. Personal attacks on Pak Chong-hui were notably absent.\*

PEKING      Thus far Peking has reacted to the new Korean agreement only with factual NCNA reports, citing KCNA, on the joint statement and on the announcements that the two envoys had visited the counterpart capitals. Peking has been on record for nearly two years as endorsing the North Korean aspiration for "peaceful unification" but has authoritatively endorsed the North Korean initiatives only selectively. A PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article praised the 29 July seven-point demand on U.S. withdrawal, and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial supported Kim's 10 January interview with the Japanese paper YOMIURI in which he proposed the North-South peace agreement. NCNA has carried reports on the Red Cross meetings, but Peking media have not been heard to comment on these contacts.

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\* See the TRENDS of 28 June, pages 17-20.

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MOSCOW Moscow has restricted itself so far to factual TASS reports of the joint statement and of Pak Song-chol's press conference, although some of the East European allies have already gone on record in press comment as approving the new Korean moves. Some of this comment has viewed the Korean agreement in a broader perspective, picturing it as a vindication of Soviet policies. Sofia's OTECHESTVEN FRONT called the agreement another proof of the vitality of the policy of peaceful coexistence; noting that it follows the Indo-Pakistani agreement, the paper added that it creates a more favorable atmosphere for the idea of Asian security. Prague's RUDE PRAVO said the agreement shows that the Soviet "peace offensive" has also affected Korea. And Bucharest's SCINTEIA and ROMANIA LIBERA said the agreement confirms the viability of the path of settling international issues by negotiations rather than by force.

Moscow has long supported Pyongyang's stand on "peaceful" unification but does not customarily comment authoritatively on Korean developments, confining itself to routine-level propaganda support. Moscow gave low-level support to the Red Cross meetings as well as to Kim Il-song's 10 January YOMIURI interview.

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## CUBA - USSR

### CASTRO VISIT MARKS "DEEPENING" OF BILATERAL RELATIONS

Prime Minister Fidel Castro's "official friendly" visit to the Soviet Union from 26 June to 5 July, capping the Cuban leader's nine-week tour of 10 African and European countries, served to dramatize the continuing amelioration of Soviet-Cuban relations and to project a picture of warmth and solidarity despite the built-in frictions and mutual suspicions in the Moscow-Havana relationship. The communique on the visit, made public on 6 July, stated that the talks between Castro and the Soviet leaders "have put the beginning to an important stage in the further expansion and deepening of the fraternal relations existing" between the two parties and states.

The communique and the tenor of public remarks by Castro and Brezhnev during the visit suggested that the Soviet leaders had attempted, with some success, to assuage Castro's apprehensions about possible Soviet compromises in the talks with President Nixon that would adversely affect the small socialist states in general, North Vietnam in particular, and ultimately Cuba. But Castro was not sufficiently won over to make any public mention of the U.S.-Soviet summit, to which Cuban media had devoted only minimal reportorial coverage and no comment. The only allusion to summitry in the communique was a reference to "the summit contacts" in a passage on activities about which the Soviet side informed the Cubans. The document contained no reciprocal reference in reporting the Cuban side's praise for Moscow's "principled, internationalist, class" policy. By contrast, an approving joint reference to the U.S.-Soviet summit appeared in the 10 June communique on the Moscow visit of Yugoslav President Tito--another leader who had harbored apparent concern about the impact of the summit on Vietnam.

Moscow's efforts to court the Cuban leader were manifest at the outset. TASS said "thousands of Muscovites" turned out to welcome his motorcade from the airport, where he had been greeted by Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin. He was awarded the Order of Lenin by Podgornyy and had several talks with all three top leaders--on bilateral relations and "pressing international problems," according to TASS, in a "friendly and comradely atmosphere" and in a "spirit of profound mutual understanding and community of views, of unbreakable friendship and loyalty

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to Marxism-Leninism and the principles of socialist internationalism." The characterization was more elaborate than that of the Castro-Kosygin talks in the 1 November 1971 joint communique, following the Soviet premier's 26-30 October visit to Cuba en route home from Canada in the wake of the 12 October announcement that President Nixon would visit the Soviet Union. Those talks were said to have passed simply in "an atmosphere of friendship and complete mutual understanding."

A dispatch filed to Havana by PRENSA LATINA's special correspondent Pedro Martinez in Moscow on 5 July said Castro promised to return to the Soviet Union in 1973 or 1974 for a "longer, unofficial visit to USSR cities and industries," but the communique noted only that an invitation for a return visit had been tendered to Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin and had been accepted. The dispatch--embargoed until 1700 GMT on 5 July--also referred, before the fact, to a recorded Soviet radio and TV interview with Castro "broadcast tonight," but TASS on 6 July reported only that the interview had been carried on Moscow TV.

**BILATERAL RELATIONS** Characterizing Soviet-Cuban relations, the joint communique said the "fraternal welcome" given the Cuban delegation everywhere during its visit to the Soviet Union constituted "an expression of the warm affection, militant solidarity, and unbreakable friendship which the Soviet people hold for the Cuban people." Following lengthy exchanges of reciprocal praise for foreign and domestic policies, the document summed up bilateral relations as "based on the principle of socialist internationalism" and as "developing successfully and growing ever more closer, diversified and rich in content, facilitating a mutual exchange of experience in every sphere of socialist and communist construction."

In discussing bilateral questions the communique predictably reflected a preoccupation with Cuba's economic situation, treated in the joint document in such a way as to register Soviet praise for Cuban intentions and efforts while begging the question of results. The communique noted that "a fruitful exchange of experiences concerning party and state activity and economic construction" took place in the course of discussions in which each side learned about the other's "progress in economic, political, and social development." The communique recorded the Soviet leaders' praise of the Cuban people's "work and

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efforts to fulfill great tasks of the national economy and their struggle to raise work productivity and improve the quality of production." This accolade prefaced a passage in which the Soviet side "welcomed with fraternal attention and great satisfaction the Cuban comrades' information on the measures they are adopting currently in order to increase the efficiency of social production and improve the living conditions of the people "

Following a condemnation by the Soviet side of the U.S. "blockade" of Cuba and a statement of Soviet support for the Cubans on the Guantanamo base issue, the communique expressed the Soviet Union's "willingness to continue lending its diverse aid to Cuba for the construction of a socialist society, the reinforcement of the country's defensive capacity, and the defense of its revolutionary conquests."

An assurance of continued support primarily in the economic sphere had been tendered by Kosygin at a 3 July reception at the Cuban embassy. "We are deeply satisfied with the results of the discussion of major questions of our bilateral cooperation," Kosygin said, and "we display fraternal understanding" of Castro's views "on the further development of the Cuban economy." He added that "coordination of the economic development plans of both countries will make it possible to make a new big step in perfecting our cooperation and in solving tasks of economic construction." The notion of "coordination" was not brought up in the communique.

In the passage on Guantanamo the communique noted Soviet support for "the unconditional removal of the U.S. Guantanamo naval base, which is located on Cuban territory in opposition to the sovereign will of the Cuban people"--a variant of the formulation in the 1 November joint communique on Kosygin's visit to Cuba. In that document the Soviet side "expressed itself against the unlawful presence of the North American military base of Guantanamo in Cuban territory."

FOREIGN AFFAIRS      The Soviet effort to reassure Castro that the U.S.-Soviet summit had not compromised Soviet ideological firmness was registered in Brezhnev's speech at a banquet for Castro on 27 June, which included a more forceful statement of Soviet support for Vietnam than had appeared in

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most recent Moscow comment.\* Brezhnev also declared, with the U.S.-Soviet summit clearly in mind, that "the assertion of the principle of peaceful coexistence and successes along this road do not mean at all a weakening of ideological struggle" but rather that "this struggle will become increasingly sharper in the course of the rivalry between the two social systems." The communique said the two sides "have once again stated their complete unanimity of views in assessing the topical international problems discussed." After noting that the Soviet side had informed the Cubans about activities since the 24th CPSU Congress "for the practical implementation of the program of actively protecting peace and promoting international security, . . . including the summit contacts carried out for the achievement of this goal," the document offered a general Cuban appraisal of Soviet foreign policy:

The Cuban side highly assessed the principled, internationalist, class policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government, which combines the struggle for asserting the principles of peaceful coexistence with firmly rebuffing the aggressive machinations of imperialism and reaction; the practical steps of the USSR to promote world peace; and the vigorous actions aimed at excluding the use of force from the solution of controversial issues.

Recording joint, essentially pro forma positions on the Middle East, Korea, and Europe, generalized statements of support for struggles against colonialism and neocolonialism, broad statements of shared support for ending the arms race and achieving general disarmament--specifically including the banning of CBW--and backing of national liberation movements, the communique asserted that Moscow and Havana are "fully on the side" of the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples "who are striving to recover their national wealth from the hands of foreign monopolies."

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\* See the 28 June TRENDS, page 7. The relatively forceful statement on Vietnam in the joint communique is discussed in the Indochina section of today's TRENDS.

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Chile and Peru were the only Latin American countries named in the communique's section on the "exchange of views on the Latin American situation," including the rise of liberation struggles, the growth of political and social forces, an allegedly growing awareness of the need for radical sociological and economic transformations, and the Cuban revolution's "great role in deepening the liberation process in Latin America." Thus the document expressed the two sides' "full solidarity" with President Allende's Popular Unity government in Chile and denounced "the interference on the part of imperialist quarters in Chile's internal affairs." And it asserted joint support for "the measures of the Peruvian Government answering that country's national interests." For the rest of the hemisphere, it offered a broad, general expression of "sympathy for the patriotic and revolutionary forces of Latin American countries struggling for freedom, independence, and social progress."

There had been similar passages on the Chilean Government and the Peruvian situation in the 1 November Kosygin-Castro communique. That document also included an expression of "sympathy"--notably absent from the current one--with the Panamanian people's quest for "full sovereignty over the whole of their national territory." Panama was, however, mentioned along with Chile and Peru in the joint communiqués issued following Castro's visits to Romania, Hungary, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia. (The available report on the joint communique with Bulgaria, monitored from the Sofia domestic service, mentioned "the growing revolutionary upsurge" of the "anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic struggle" in Latin America, but named no specific countries.)

#### THE EAST EUROPEAN JOINT COMMUNIQUE

The communiques on Castro's East European visits covered the same general ground as the one signed in Moscow, pointing to a deepening and strengthening of bilateral relations but--as was the case in Moscow--reporting no conclusion of agreements. Special angles were played in the various communiques reflecting specific aspects of Cuban relations with the countries in question or the particular situations of those countries. For example, the GDR-Cuban communique called for the GDR's admission to the United Nations and its specialized agencies, and the Cuban-Czechoslovak communique recalled Cuban support for the Soviet bloc's "internationalist" assistance to Czechoslovakia in 1968. Generally similar passages on Indochina, Korea, the Middle East, Europe, Latin America, and Guantanamo appeared in all the documents.

Notably, no communique or final official report of any kind marked the conclusion of Castro's eight-day sojourn in Poland, which included talks with Gierek and other top Polish leaders. Neither Havana nor Warsaw media have shed light on the circumstances of this omission.

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## SOUTH ASIA

## MOSCOW HAILS SIMLA PACT, FAVORS GREATER ROLE FOR BANGLADESH

Following optimistic but cautious anticipatory comment and reportage on the 28 June-2 July Simla talks between Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Pakistani President Ali Bhutto, Soviet media have welcomed the outcome as proof of the efficacy of negotiations to solve complex problems and have aired calls for Bangladesh participation in future talks.

TASS's initial brief report of the Simla agreement on Indian-Pakistani relations quoted the Indian news agency PTI's characterization of the document as "a considerable stride toward lasting peace" in the area. TASS on the 4th cited Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's statement that the Simla talks marked "the beginning of a new era in the relations of friendship and cooperation between India and Pakistan" and President Bhutto's contention that the results did not signify "the defeat of one or other side" but rather "the victory of the principles of justice, the victory of sanity." Moscow radio commentaries depicted the summit outcome as testimony that "controversial problems can and should be solved by peaceful means" and that "a realistic and constructive approach to world problems, no matter how complex they might be, yields positive results."

Praising both the Indian and Pakistani leaders for "their sincere aspiration for a normalization of relations and for the preservation of peace" between the two countries, a Simla-dated dispatch in PRAVDA on 4 July noted that both sides had agreed on "the main point--the necessity to continue efforts aimed at further guaranteeing a relaxation of tension and the creation of an atmosphere of good-neighborliness and fruitful cooperation between India and Pakistan." This, the dispatch added, accords with the "vital interests" of the peoples of the subcontinent. In a similar vein, an IZVESTIYA article on 5 July viewed the Simla results as "an important step on the road to peaceful cooperation between the neighboring countries." Both articles, underscoring the point that much remained to be done, commented that in view of the complexity of the situation no one could have expected the Simla summit to produce an instant, full solution.

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In effect urging greater involvement of Bangladesh in the solution of problems of the subcontinent, TASS on the 4th cited sources in Dacca and Rawalpindi for the observation that Pakistani recognition of Bangladesh should now logically follow and would further promote the establishment of a lasting peace on the subcontinent. This theme had been played by Moscow radio in the period just prior to the summit. For instance, Moscow broadcasts in English to South Asia on 25 June and in Hindi on the 26th deemed it "significant" that "general public opinion favors equal Indian-Pakistani-Bangladesh tripartite talks to resolve problems of the Indian subcontinent."

Pre-summit Soviet radio comment had combined cautious optimism on possible summit results with the warning that "certain internal and external forces" were intensifying their propaganda campaign against the summit. A Moscow broadcast on the 26th, for example, cited "rightwing Pakistani reaction and religious party leaders" and "Jana Sangh leaders in India." Other pre-summit Soviet broadcasts denounced the "U.S. imperialists and China's Mao Tse-tung leadership" for opposing "a durable peace and security" in the area.

CHINESE REACTION      In Peking's first acknowledgment of any Indian-Pakistani talks, NCNA on 5 July reported the principal provisions of the Simla accord and dwelt extensively on President Bhutto's speech on his return to Lahore in which he stressed that he had not compromised Pakistani positions or principles. NCNA quoted Bhutto as saying that the Simla decisions "were the first step" and that "the path on which they were treading was beset with difficulties"; it also noted his statement that "China has always stood by Pakistan." NCNA made no reference to "Bangladesh," using the term "East Pakistan" in noting that Bhutto had promised the Pakistanis that "the East Pakistan issue would not be discussed on Indian soil."

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## FRG - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

## PRAGUE COMMENT ON TALKS FORESEES "MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE" RESULT

In tune with the conciliatory stance taken by Husak in his 12 June Prague speech to the CSSR trade union congress, Czechoslovak comment on the two-day FRG-CSSR talks which opened in Prague on 29 June has backed away from the previous uncompromising demand that Bonn recognize the invalidity of the Munich pact from its inception. Instead, the comment has taken the milder tack of in effect asking the FRG to understand that Prague cannot agree that the Munich document was valid at any time.

CTK reported on the 30th that "an open and good atmosphere" marked the fifth round of the "sounding-out talks" between CSSR Deputy Foreign Minister Goetz and FRG State Secretary Frank, looking toward negotiations on normalizing bilateral relations. The Prague radio on 19 November had described the atmosphere of the fourth session, held in Rothenburg, West Germany, only as "businesslike and frank." Where in November Prague said the participants "agreed that they will continue the talks," the report this time said the two sides "decided to inform their respective governments on the results of the talks held so far."

In his 12 June trade union congress speech, Husak had refrained from demanding that the FRG recognize the invalidity of the Munich pact ab initio, remarking instead that "naturally, we cannot ignore the ignominious Munich agreement" or "pass over it as if nothing had happened." He went on to assert that "we assume this will also be understood by our partners in West Germany" and that in the upcoming end-of-June talks "we will find further mutually acceptable solutions to these contentious questions." A Moscow radio commentary by Gorelov on Soviet and Czechoslovak foreign policy aims, broadcast in Czech and Slovak on the 14th, approvingly cited these remarks and went on to note that "Czechoslovakia's legitimate demand on this matter is fully supported by the Soviet Union" and the other socialist countries.

On the 29th a Federal Assembly speech by hardlining CSSR Foreign Minister Chnoupek was generally in tune with Husak's conciliatory stance. Chnoupek observed that "naturally we cannot leave open . . . the shameful Munich agreement." While insisting that "the declaration of the invalidity of this diktat ab initio is a just demand for respecting law and an expression of an honest will to

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seek a mutually acceptable solution," he "saw no reason why" the bilateral talks opening in Prague that day "could not constitute a positive step forward." Videotaped excerpts of Chnoupek's speech were carried on Prague TV.

The moderated Czechoslovak line on the Munich issue was sustained in a speech by CSSR Interior Minister Kaska to border guards at Chab on 3 July, three days after the conclusion of the fifth round of talks. As reported in the Bratislava domestic service, Kaska said mildly that "nobody can wonder that in these negotiations we do not ignore" the Munich pact. He reportedly "emphasized that we could never recognize the validity" of the document, expressing at the same time "the conviction that the FRG representatives would understand this fact and that a solution would be found which would be acceptable to both sides."

On a less authoritative level, an article in the 29 June Bratislava PRAVDA welcomed the fact that "from the latest declarations of government offices in Bonn it follows that they recognize the immoral and inhuman nature" of the Munich agreement. But the article scored Chancellor Brandt's "playing with words" in his 24 May Vienna press conference statement that the pact "was completely unjust and therefore it is invalid today." Rejecting such a distinction, which stopped short of branding the pact invalid at the time it was concluded, the commentator argued that "whenever some agreement contradicts justice, it also contradicts law" and insisted that the pact "must be condemned as not having had even a temporary validity." The article was optimistic, however, in stating at the outset that because of Bonn's ratification of the treaties with the USSR and Poland and progress in the FRG-CSSR talks, "our representatives have voiced the conviction that it is possible to come to a common, basic, and mutually acceptable attitude and that after the inevitable preparations the official negotiations [on normalizing bilateral relations] can also begin."

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## CHINA

### PEKING FAILS TO ISSUE EDITORIAL ON PARTY ANNIVERSARY

Peking continued its recent pattern of playing down anniversaries--dating from National Day last October, around the time of Lin Piao's downfall, and sustained on May Day this year--by failing to carry the customary editorial commemorating the 1 July anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party. Party Day had been regularly marked with central press editorials since the advent of the cultural revolution in 1966. A lengthy joint PEOPLE'S DAILY/RED FLAG/LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial commemorated the 50th anniversary last year. This year, Peking papers marked the occasion with pictures of Mao, with Mao quotations, and with somewhat more than the usual number of articles on the party's role.

While Party Day has never ranked with National Day and May Day as an occasion for leader turnouts, the notion of leadership solidarity was underscored by the appearance of most of the leaders at the conclusion of a national athletic tournament on the party anniversary date. Highlighted by Mao's reappearance to greet Sri Lanka Prime Minister Bandaranaike on 28 June, there have been recent public appearances of all the active central leaders, including such aging figures as Chu Te and Tung Pi-wu.

A paucity of provincial leader appearances last month lent credence to foreign press reports of leadership conferences in Peking. No provincial first secretary made a publicized appearance in his province between the end of May and the last week in June. The first to reappear was Kwangsi First Secretary Wei Kuo-ching, on 26 June and again on 2 July. CCP Politburo member and Liaoning party chief Chen Hsi-lien greeted Mme. Bandaranaike in Liaoning on 30 June and appeared with her thereafter during her visit to the province.

Further suggesting that leadership consultations have taken place, a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 6 July intimated that decisions had been reached on the future course of party rectification. Citing the accomplishments of "the previous period of study" since the second plenary session of the ninth central committee, the editorial called on localities to "sum up" the previous experiences and make plans to raise the quality of study to a "new high."

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